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When a lawyer and an economist are asked to speak successive-
ly on the subject of price stabilization standards, it is perhaps im-
plicit in the invitation that the lawyer should talk about legal
limitations on the Price Director's powers and leave it to the econo-
mist to discuss how, within those limitations, the broad policy
goals may best be achieved. If such were the division, I should
yield back the bulk of my time to our economist. As I will try to
show, the crucial decisions being made and to be made lie, for
the most part, comfortably within the area committed by law to
administrative discretion. In other words, the Director's main
worries will not be over when he can do and successfully withstand
judicial review but rather over what he should do as a matter of
wise policy.
It is, however, an occupational disease of price control lawyers
to talk as though they were economists, and the jurisdictional line
where their special competence steps has always been rather
shadowy.
I will at least start out like a lawyer with a bit of definition
of terms. In talk about standards for price stabilization, the word
"standards" is used in two very different senses, and the two are
often confused. First, "standards" may refer to the guides to ad-
ministrative action found in the governing statute. I suppose that
as a teacher of administrative law I ought to make passing refer-
ence to the constitutional necessity that these standards be precise
enough to save the statute from being invalidated as an improper
delegation of legislative power. There is no likelihood, however,
that the Defense Production Act will meet the fate of the NIRA.
That question seems foreclosed by the Yakus case, in which the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was sustained against an
attack on this ground.
It is not, therefore, the constitutional adequacy of the standards
which will concern us but rather the limitations which these stand-
ards impose upon the Price Director's action. (For convenience I
will speak of the Director as though he were the direct recipient
of the power delegated by Congress. The Defense Production Act
in fact confers all power upon the President with authority to
delegate it as he chooses. The President created the Economic
Stabilization Agency and delegated all his powers under Title IV,
the part of the law dealing with price and wage stabilization, to
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the Stabilization Administrator. The latter redelegated the price
powers to the Price Director.)
The second way in which the word "standards" is used is with
reference to the administrative standards of the Director's own
making. As I will demonstrate later, the statutory standards are
in such general terms that the Director is bound for both practical
and legal reasons to develop more specific rules for his own guid-
ance and that of his staff. The formulation of these administrative
standards is the Director's most exacting task.
For the purposes of the present discussion of statutory pricing
standards, I am going to limit myself, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps,
to those which relate to the conditions under which controls may
be instituted and to the price levels at which they may be estab-
lished and maintained. This will eliminate some of the peripheral
problems such as statutory restrictions on methods or techniques
of control. Furthermore, I am not going to dwell at any length
on the pricing of agricultural commodities. This is because Con-
gress here provided very specific standards, chief of which is the
traditional parity yardstick, below which the Director cannot go
in pricing farm products. He has already manifested his intention
to control them as rapidly as the law permits, and it can hardly be
questioned that it is within his legal power to do this. Neither, I
would say, is there a reasonable basis for questioning the policy
judgment that the general controls already covering the rest of
the economy should be extended to farm products when the statu-
tory standard permits.
My discussion of pricing standards, statutory and aministra-
tive, will center upon six major questions which the Director either
has decided or must decide. They are:
(1) Should controls be imposed on a selective basis or
generally?
(2) When should they be imposed?
(3) What technique of control should be resorted to in
the first instance?
(4) At what price levels should ceilings be fixed?
(5) Under what circumstances is it necessary as a matter
of law to modify price ceilings?
(6) What are the most effective techniques of control that
can be developed?
The first four of these questions have already been resolved by
the Director, on January 26, by the issuance of the General Ceiling
Price Regulation, and so in a sense they are academic. Neverthe-
less I think they merit some discussion, particularly as they are
relevant to consideration of the future. I will take them up in
order.
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I. Should Controls Be Imposed on a Selective Basis or Gen-
erally
In form Congress offered a choice between proceeding through
selective or general controls. In actuality, however, there was no
such freedom of choice. This was because the act provided that
when a price ceiling was fixed for a particular material or service
wages must be stabilized in that industry at the same time. Ob-
viously Congress was fearful lest price ceilings would be fixed and
wages left free to move upward so as to cut unfairly into business
profits. The principle that the general control of prices should be
accompanied by the general control of wages is elementary, but
when this sound general principle is applied to a single industry
it becomes economically indefensible and politically impossible.
To the manufacturer wages are part of his costs, and naturally he
is worried by the prospect of frozen prices and fluid costs. To the
worker, on the other hand, the price of the goods he makes is of
little moment. His concern is with the cost of living generally-
with what his wage dollar will buy in terms of food, clothing, and
shelter. No convincing reason can be given him for freezing his
wages when those of the neighbor he meets at the corner grocery
store are not frozen.
There was, to be sure, the possibility of a limited use of selec-
tive controls despite this price-wage tie-up, and in two instances,
automobiles and hides, the Director tried it. It was clear, however,
that as a practical matter it was general controls or nothing.
H. When Should General Controls Be Imposed
The statute does not furnish an explicit guide to the Director's
discretion on this question. Mandatory controls are permitted only
to the extent that the objectives of the act could not be attained
by voluntary action, a finding which it was not hard to make. As
already stated, either selective or general controls are authorized.
Control over an individual commodity required a finding that it
"has risen or threatens to rise unreasonably above the price pre-
vailing during the period from May 24, 1950, to June 24, 1950,"
and that "such price increase will materially affect the cost of living
or the national defense." There is no corresponding provision with
respect to general controls. In his statement of considerations for
the general freeze, the Director found that prices generally had
risen and were threatening further to rise to an extent inconsistent
with the purposes of the act. It would seem that this finding, un-
assailable as a matter of statistical fact, justified the Director's
action as a matter of law.
The only question fairly open was whether action should be
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
delayed because the agency was not yet staffed and ready for the
job. It was a dispute on this issue that led to Mr. Valentine's resig-
nation as Stabilization Administrator. The Washington staff was
woefully small; field offices were non-existent. There was cer-
tainly basis for the fear that precipitate action in these circum-
stances would cause such havoc and confusion that the whole
stabilization effort would be discredited for a long time to come.
On the other hand the price picture was worsening at an unprece-
dented rate. The decision to act was a daring gamble that the lack
of preparation would not prove too costly. Whether it will pay off
still hangs in the balance.
III. What Technique of Control Should Be Resorted to in the
First Instance
Actually the decision to act on January 26 left only one pos-
sible answer to this question. A general freeze was the only thing
that could be done quickly. A handful of people, a few pairs of
scissors, a pot of paste and copies of OPA's General Maximum
Price Regulation and MPR 188 could do the job in short order.
To the credit of Mr. DiSalle's lawyers, they were able, despite the
time pressure, to make some drafting improvements and a few
substantive changes. But essentially one of my colleagues summed
it up when he greeted me with the words, "I see that OPA is
playing a return engagement by popular demand-though with-
out the original Washington cast."
I am sure the OPS lawyers were fully aware of the difficulties
inherent in a general freeze-the problems of definition ("pur-
chaser of the same class", "most closely competitive seller of the
same class" and so on); the inevitable gaps and distortions; the
squeeze and the retail lag; the problem of the seasonal commodity
with an abnormal base period price; the difficulties in enforce-
ability; all these and many others were an old story to lawyers
who had been in OPA, as the chief draftsmen of the present freeze
had been.
The inescapable fact remains, however, that once the decision
to take action was made, there was no practicable alternative to
the general freeze. The difficulties, which multiply greatly with
the passage of time, point up the desirability of moving as rapidly
as possible away from the freeze. They do not provide effective
argument against the freeze as a stop-gap method, useful until
something better can be worked out.
I remarked in an article in the November, 1950, Harvard Law
Review that a responsible government surely ought to avoid if it
can the creation of the inequities and dislocations inherent in a
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general freeze until it is equipped to correct them with reasonable
speed. I still think that was a sound observation. I am confident
that those who decided to go ahead on January 26 would not chal-
lenge its soundness. They went ahead with the hope, rather than
with the assurance, that they could create the necessary organiza-
tion in time and were well aware of the consequences if they failed.
In the light of the frightening upsurge of prices, I am not disposed
to quarrel with the decision. I do quarrel, however, with the fact
that so little was done to build the organization in the four and a
half months after Congress enacted the Defense Production Act.
There lies the root of the present atmosphere of chaos. In fairness
it must be conceded that it was and is hard to get first-rate people
to accept government jobs. There have been so many instances
of irresponsible criticism of honorable and conscientious public
servants that the reluctance to subject one's self and one's family
to the possibility of unwarranted personal attack is understand-
able, and this is no small factor in the recruitment problem. It
nevertheless remains true that much more could and should have
been done to prepare for the clearly foreseeable day when controls
would be needed.
IV. At What Levels Should Maximum Prices Be Fixed
This question runs into the succeeding ones because the sta-
tutory standards for the initial imposition and for the subsequent
maintenance of controls are the same, although the administrative
standards may be very different. At this point a scrutiny of the
statutory standards is necessary. The primary standard, as it was
in the Emergency Price Control Act, is that prices must be "gen-
erally fair and equitable" and must effectuate the purposes of the
act. It is perfectly apparent that this standard is so general that
the Director has very broad discretion in deciding at what level
to establish a ceiling. To be sure, somewhat more specific stand-
ards appear later in the same section of the act. The Director "so
far as practicable" must give "due consideration" to prices pre-
vailing in the May 24 to June 24 period, or the nearest representa-
tive period. He must also give "due consideration" to the national
effort to achieve maximum production and to such relevant factors
as he may determine to be of general applicability, including among
others general increases or decreases in profits earned by sellers
subsequent to June 24, 1950. The enumerated factors were also
substantially copied from the Price Control Act, and the history
of OPA regulations in the courts demonstrates, if demonstration
be necessary, how slight an impediment these added standards are
to the exercise of the Director's judgment. It is the Director who
decides how far it is "practicable" to consider, what consideration
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
is "due", what factors are "relevant" and of "general applicability"
and so on. As a practical matter, they call for care in the composi-
tion of the "statement of considerations" required to accompany
each regulation but they give little comfort to the seller seeking
to attack the regulation in court. It is reasonable to assume, since
the standards of the former law were so religiously followed by
Congress, that the judicial decisions under that law are highly
relevant to the question of the scope of the Director's powers.
Congress must be assumed to have known what the Price Ad-
ministrator did, and what the courts upheld as within his power
to do. It is highly significant, particularly when we remember
how thoroughly OPA eventually outlived its Congressional wel-
come, that Congress when confronted by a new emergency was
content to delegate its powers in virtually the same terms as before.
It is of especial significance that scarcely a trace of the spate of
post-war restrictive amendments is found in the new law. Con-
gress can, of course, recall any part of the power it has given if
it does not approve the way it is exercised. That is an essential
part of our democratic processes. It is heartening, however, that
the new Director is not starting out with the same shackles that
were finally forged for his predecessors.
Given these statutory standards and having determined on the
freeze method, the crucial question becomes the freeze date. It
may be taken as thorough settled by the OPA court decisions that
the words "generally fair and equitable" do not require that each
individual seller be assured of maximum prices which will permit
him a profit either on an over-all basis or with respect to a par-
ticular commodity. Hence there is an overwhelming presumption
that prices frozen at current levels, as was done in the recent reg-
ulation, are generally fair and equitable to sellers at the time of
the freeze. That they may not remain so in the face of rising costs
is quite another question. It is also reasonably clear that a freeze
as of an earlier date would have been legally justifiable. The OPA
Administrator issued the GMPR on April 28, 1942, and took the
month of March as the base period. The failure to "roll back"
prices this time has been a source of much criticism.
The decision, to "roll-back" or not to "roll-back", points up
Chester Bowles' frequent comment, "There are no good alterna-
tives in price control - only a choice between poor ones." There is
certainly force to the argument for a roll-back. A freeze at current
levels favors the inflationist and penalizes the seller who has tried
to hold his prices down because he was asked to by his govern-
ment. On December 19, 1950, Administrator Valentine issued and
published in the Federal Register a set of voluntary pricing stand-
ards, in which he solemnly gave the assurance "that no seller will
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derive any advantage from price increases after December 1." Here
was a pledge of the government's good faith by a man then en-
titled to pledge it. That pledge was broken. Such a breach of faith
is a bad thing at best, justifiable only if the alternative is a worse
thing.
Actually, there were many persuasive administrative reasons
for not attempting a roll-back at this time. (Of course the decision
does not preclude later roll-backs in particular cases.)
When OPA issued its general freeze, the agency had 3711
employees in the national office; it had regional and district offices
with good-sized staffs already intensively trained to administer
this regulation. ESA had only 650 employees in all (most of them
apparently engaged in trying to hire others) and no one whatever
in field offices except a handful of housekeepers charged with the
mechanics of organization. There was no one to explain or inter-
pret what was of necessity a complicated regulation. By saying,
"Your prices when you open today must be just what they were
when you closed yesterday", the immediate problems of interpre-
tation were reduced to the minimum. A seller could comply by
doing nothing to change his existing prices. A roll-back would
have required the consulting of records and extensive repricing
-the GMPR allowed a three-week period for retailers between
the announcement and the effective date, and the country was
flooded with 2 million pamphlets on "what every retailer should
know about GMPR." Moreover, the problems bound to come
under any freeze as the seller's shelves empty and are replaced by
new and different goods at new and higher prices, would have
come that much sooner if a roll-back had been used. The OPS was
buying valuable time to prepare itself for action by adopting a
current freeze.
V. Under What Circumstances Is It Necessary as a Matter
of Law to Modify Price Ceilings
I have already described the statutory standards for maximum
prices. While they pose no very serious legal problems in connec-
tion with a general price freeze at current levels, the question of
when a price ceases to be generally fair and equitable is the hard-
est of all the Director's problems.
It must be recognized that the business of regulating prices
throughout our economy has to be the work of many hands. The
Director can only give general policy guidance to his staff and
make major policy decisions. If he says to his various commodity
branches, "Maintain generally fair and equitable prices giving due
consideration to all the things the law says we should", what would
happen? The question is a rhetorical one.
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The Director is bound not merely by the statute but by the
general requirements of constitutional and administrative law. This
means that he cannot accept the freedom of action that Congress
has apparently given him. He cannot proceed on a case by case
basis with unsystematized notions of what the statutory standards
mean. He must narrow his own range of discretion by formulating
administrative standards and applying them evenhandedly. Effec-
tive internal administration and decent industry relations (and
congressional relations) compel this course as a matter of good
sense. It is equally compelled as a matter of law. If the Director
is arbitrary or capricious, the courts will call him to account. His
only effective defense against the charge of arbitrary or capricious
conduct is to decide how in his judgment "generally fair and equit-
able" should be translated into official action and then to act con-
sistently within his self-imposed limits. To be sure, he has a broad
area of choice at the outset. "Generally fair and equitable" are
not words of fixed and invariable content. He is in no way bound
to use the same standards the OPA Administrator did and that
the court then approved. Neither is he bound to adhere to the
same standards indefinitely. They can and doubtless will be modi-
fied in the light of experience and changing conditions. But he
cannot, without a clear justification, depart for the purpose of an
individual case from the standards to which he purports to adhere.
In point of fact, instead of adding to his burden in the courts
by these self-imposed limits on his own discretion, the development
of administrative standards lightens the burden of litigation. Once
such a standard has been sustained on judicial review, it is vali-
dated for the future and the question for review in succeeding
cases is whether the Director has abided by his own rules or justi-
fied a departure from them.
I will not be so bold as to suggest what these administrative
standards should in fact be. I will, however, set forth some of the
things which it can be asserted with confidence are within the Di-
rector's legal power to do. This confidence is based upon Emer-
gency Court of Appeals decisions with respect to the OPA Admin-
istrator's powers.
1. As already mentioned, a price may be "generally fair and
equitable" even though some high cost individual sellers cannot
operate at a profit within the ceilings. They may, of course, be
given special treatment to assure needed production or for other
reasons, but they cannot demand it as of right.
2. A cost increase to a manufacturer or to a distributor does
not necessarily have to be reflected by a price increase in order to
keep a ceiling generally fair and equitable. Indeed, it is the Direc-
tor's duty so far as possible to require cost increases to be absorbed
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where there is an existing margin of profit reasonably sufficient to
absorb them.
3. It is appropriate in considering the need of a price increase
to apply the "generally fair and equitable" standard to the over-
all operations of an industry rather than to each individual com-
modity. The Price Administrator developed as a basic standard
the proposition that price relief was called for only if the over-all
earnings before taxes of the industry in question were less than
in a representative peace-time period, ordinarily 1936-39. This was
supplemented, as applied to an industry making several products,
by the further proposition that relief was required for a particular
product only if the members of the industry, excluding the high-
cost marginal fringe, were incurring out-of-pocket losses on that
product. The Emergency Court of Appeals upheld both the "in-
dustry earnings" and the "product" standard. These decisions
would seem to justify a similar approach to the problem this time,
since there is no significant change in the statutory language.
If the Director should formulate a new "industry earnings
standard" as the basic criterion for the need of a price increase
and should select, for example, the years 1946 to 1949 as a repre-
sentative period for purposes of comparison, it is reasonable to
predict that the court would sustain him. I might add that I did
not pick the years 1946-49 out of thin air- they are the years Mr.
Valentine used for his proposed voluntary pricing standards last
December. Of course I have no knowledge that the Director plans
to use this particular period.
4. It is appropriate in considering the need for price relief to
look to the adequacy of earnings before rather than after taxes.
As obvious as this may seem, the contrary was earnestly urged
upon OPA until the matter was settled by judicial decision.
VI. What Are the Most Effective Techniques of Control That
Can Be Developed
This question clearly crosses the line staking out the area of
the lawyer's special competence. I should nevertheless like to
venture a few observations.
Direct controls over prices and wages are not designed to cure
the disparity between purchasing power and available goods. That
must be done by other means- heavy taxation, curbs on credit,
and the like. Direct controls are designed to prevent wages from
pushing up prices and prices pushing up wages in never-ending
succession. Hence the attack on prices should be concentrated
where they produce the spiral. Essential foods, clothing and shelter
should be controlled as firmly as possible. This is the bare mini-
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mum to which some other cost of living items should probably be
added.
Most other prices could, in my opinion, wisely be freed of
controls. If the fear is that scarce materials or manpower would
be diverted to these uncontrolled areas, it seems to me much more
sensible to prevent this diversion when necessary by direct control
over these materials and labor rather than by indirect control
through price ceilings.
OPA had many regulations it made no pretense of enforcing.
The agency's field investigators were officially instructed not to
waste the limited enforcement manpower on commodities not vital
to the cost of living. I believe that a regulation not important
enough to try to enforce is not important enough to write, particu-
larly in view of the fact that we are devising a regulatory structure
that may well have to last for a long time. I think that reasonable
doubts should be resolved against, not in favor, of, controls.
My recommendations for future action would include the fol-
lowing:
(1) Replace the freeze with specific regulations on basic raw
materials, using May-June 1950 prices as a point of reference so
that unwarranted price increases since then would be cancelled out.
(2) For such manufacturing industry as there is sufficient
reason to continue and control, replace the freeze with a formula
type of regulation designed at least to limit unit dollar margins
over direct cost to those prevailing in the pre-Korean period.
(3) For the distributive trades, replace the freeze with regu-
lations designed to preserve the individual seller's historic per-
centage markup over acquisition cost. The technique developed
by OPA in its MPR 580 in the latter stages of its history was
generally satisfactory and is worth copying. I believe that in fact,
such a regulation is now in process of preparation. Ideally the
historic markup should be that prevailing in the month of May 24
to June 24, 1950. I do not know, however, whether investigation
would indicate that there have been enough increases in such
markups in recent months to justify the added burden of trying to
go back as far as pre-Korean records to determine the historic
markup. That burden would be great, as many retailers' records
have probably not been preserved.
(4) Place controls on agricultural commodities as soon as
the statutory standards permit and apply the general principles
already suggested to the later stages of processing and distribution.
(5) The methods so far proposed would produce retail prices
varying from store to store. In order to make enforcement easier
and consumer participation possible, I would move as rapidly as
feasible to uniform dollar-and-cent ceilings on critical food items,
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notably meat. Meat price control was the thorniest single problem
before and it doubtless wil be again, but it is one that must be
effectively solved if the program of controlling living costs is to
have any chance to succeed.
(6) Similarly I would put uniform dollar-and-cent controls
on basic low-cost apparel items. This program will be effective
only if the government by vigorous use of its allocation powers
sees to it that such items are produced in quantity. Otherwise
past history will repeat itself and low-priced goods will disappear
from the market in favor of high-cost higher-profit items, a shift
which ceiling prices cannot prevent.
I cannot promise, of course, that prices fixed as suggested and
wages fixed by whatever stabilization formula is adopted will
wind up in fair balance. Some further accommodation may have
to be made. It is too much to expect any general agreement as to
what is a fair balance among the competing demands of the worker,
the farmer, and the businessman. But this much is clear; it is to
the long-run interest of all groups that a balance be struck and
held, and that the wage-price spiral be arrested.
